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Turning Blood Into Whine - 
"Fear of Aids" As A Cognizable 
Cause Of Action In New Mexico 
Eric J. Knapp 
ScSchnnl of Law L~brary 
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4iDwacrefaue, New hdexlc0 87131-1441 
P- 
TURNING BLOOD INTO WHINE - "FEAR OF AIDS" AS A COGNIZABLE CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN NEW MEXICO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Madrid v. Lincoln Countv Medical center' is the first New Mexico case to recognize a 
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) arising from possible 
exposure to the virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The court in 
Madrid held that recognition of emotional distress claims arising out of a negligently created fear 
of contracting the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) through a medically sound channel of 
transmission does not require proof of actual exposure to the virus.' In other words, it matters not 
whether the suspected conduit of disease transmission actually carries HIV at the time of the 
alleged exposure incident? 
With the Madrid decision, New Mexico join% a minority of jurisdictions that allow 
recovery for emotional distress arising fiom fear of possibly developing AIDS regardless of the 
threat posed by the actual transmission of H I V . ~  In arriving at its decision, the Madrid court 
' 122 N.M. 269,923 P2d 1154 (1996). 
See id. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159. 
3-- To wit, there may be circumstances under which exposure may be presumed. &(reciting the analysis from 
Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996), affd and modified in Dart, 696 
A 2d 14 CN I 1997)) .. .- - . .
4 - - -  .,,. See Marchica v. Long Island RR., 3 1 F.3d 1197 (2d Cu. 1994); Bordelon v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d 
476<~a.  Ct. App. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 
1997); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991). See James Cahoy, New Mexico 
Su~reme Court Allows 'Fear of AIDS' Suit in Absence of Proof of Exvosure, 9-18-96 WLN 9845, at I, available in 
1996 WL 524414 ("Going against the prevailing legal trend, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled.. . that 
plaintiffs may sue for 'fear of AIDS' if they have reason to believe they have been exposed to the virus--even if they 
have no proof of actual exposure,"). The Marchica case has been distinguished 6om the other "fear of AIDS" cases 
because it involved a claim brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), see 45 U.S.C. $5 5 1-60 
(1994), which employs a "more relaxed negligence standard." See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553,560 n.9 
(Minn. 1995). Additionally, the decision from Castro is contrary to subsequent holdings 60m otherNew York 
courts. Brown v. New Yolk City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880,886 (App. Div. 1996); 
Druly v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668,674 n.l l (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); NY ADD. Div. A f f m s  
Dismissal of HIV Fear Suit for Lack of Ex~osure Proof, 1997 Andrews AIDS Litig. Rep. 17167 (April 11, 1997) 
(discussing the decision in Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997)). With the 
.--. Madrid decision, New Mexico joins Maryland and New Jersey as the only jurisdictions in which the highest court 
pennits recovery in the absence of actual exposure. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 560 n.9; AIDS Update, 14 No. 9 
Med. Malpractice L. & Strategy 3 (July, 1997); Kathy Barrett Carter, AIDS Fear. Not Virus. Enough for Lawsuit 
Supreme Court Rules for Cleaning Woman Cut by Surgical Knife, Star-Ledger. July 22, 1997, at I, available in 
1997 WL 12543822. 
rejected the tort-recovery principles formulated in the "fear of future disease" cases.' Instead, the 
- 
court applied the traditional "physical impact" rule and reasoned that one's fear of developing 
AIDS in the future is a rational concern-irrespective of actual HIV exposure-so long as there 
exists a medically recognized mode of transmi~sion.~ 
The implications of this decision go beyond concerns over excessive litigation, 
genuineness of claims, and the reasonableness of claimants' fears. The court's decision 
unnecessarily contributes to the gratuitous phobia that continues to surround AIDS, and 
promotes irrational beliefs concerning the manner and facility of HIV transmission. This Note 
reviews the evolution and current understanding ofjudicial tests for NIED analysis, questions the 
rationale employed by the Madrid court in its opinion, and discusses the implications fiom 
Madrid of recognizing a cause of action for emotional distress arising out of a fear ofpossibly 
developing AIDS, absent proof of actual HIV exposure. 
- 
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 28,1992, Sonia Madrid was transporting medical samples, including 
blood products, fiom Lincoln County Medical Center in Ruidoso, New Mexico to laboratory 
facilities in ~ l b u ~ u e r ~ u e . ~  At some point in transit, Madrid's hands were splashed with bloody 
fluid leaking from two to four sample containers.' The sample containers were inspected when 
they arrived in Albuquerque and only a single container was determined to have leaked fluid. 
Madrid claims that unheded paper cuts present on her hands at the time of the incident came into 
contact with the bloody fluid. Aware of the widespread publicity surrounding AIDS, Madrid 
More specifically, the "fear of cancer." See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 275,923 P.2d at 1160 (discussing the reasoning, 
holding, and application of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)). See generally Foumier 
J. Gale, 111 & James L. Goyer, 111, Recovew for Canceruhobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 723 
(1 985). 
'See Madrid. 122N.M. at 278,923 P.2d at 1163. 
'The facts are paraphrased from the oourt of appeals opinion in Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr,, 121 N.M. 133, 
135-36,909 P.2d 14,16-17 (Ct. App.), cert. eranted. 120 N.M. 828,907 P.2d 1009 (1995), and affd, remanded, 122 
N.M. 269,923 P.2d 1154 (1996). 
' It is unclear h m  the fact pattern where the containers were located during transport, and how the leaking fluid 
came into contact with the plaintiffs hands. 
knew that it was possible to contract the causative virus (HIV) through contact between open 
wounds and bodily fluids, primarily HIV-infected blood. 
After the incident, Madrid consulted a physician who advised her that due to the variable 
latency periodg of the virus she should be tested periodically over the next six months to a year. 
The recommendation was made without knowing whether the culprit blood sample was HIV- 
positive or HIV-negative. Not until two months later did Madrid learn that the patient with 
whose blood she had been splattered tested HIV-negative. However, because her physician 
instructed her to get tested several times, Madrid felt that the single test result from the source 
was inconclusive, ever] if it was negative. Furthermore, believing that more than one sample had 
leaked, she thought necessary additional testing of those sample sources as  well. Not until 
Lincoln County MedicaI Center filed an affidavit nearly two years after the incident did she learn 
that only one specimen had leaked, and that it was HIV-negative. Pursuant to advice from her 
- 
physician, Madrid was prophylactically inoculated against hepatitis A and B. She was also tested 
for HIV at periodic intervals over a span of six months. Test results for this time period all came 
back HIV-negative. 
Madrid sued Lincoln County Medical Center for NIED arising from her fear that she 
might have contracted HIV as a result of being negligently exposed to bloody fluid of unknown 
origin. She sought damages for medical and other expenses, lost wages, and for pain and 
suffering. The Medical Center moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. 
The district court agreed with the rule adopted by the majority of other jurisdictions "that actual 
exposure to HIV is a threshold requirement in any claim for emotional-distress damages arising 
9 The term "latency period" has been used to refer to both the time lapse between initial HIV infection and the onset 
--. of symptomatic AIDS disease, see Jessamine R. Talavera, Quintana v. United Blood Services: Examining Industry 
Practice in Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 2 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 475,519 n.11 (1993), and thetime 
between initial HIV infection and the development of HIV antibodies, see Joycelyn L. Cole, AIDS-Phobia: Are 
Emotional Distress Damages for a Fear ofAlDS a Leeallv Cornpensable Iniw?, 19 T. Marshall L. Rev. 333,337 
(1994). 
out of a fear of having contracted AIDS."" The New Mexico Court of Appeals subsequently 
- 
reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment While acknowledging that the majority 
ofjurisdictions throughout the United States had adopted the "actual exposure" rule, the court of 
appeals nonetheless concluded that "threshold proof of the presence of H N  in the disease- 
transmitting agent would not be required."" The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the 
court of appeals' decision holding that proof of actual exposure to HIV was not required lo 
sustain a cause of action for NTED based on a fear of developing AIDS provided a medically 
sound channel of transmission exists." 
111. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
In terms of a cause of action for emotional distress arising from a negligently created fear 
of contracting HIV and possibly developing AIDS, Madrid represents a case of first impression 
in New ~ e x i c o . "  While rules governing recovery for NIED in the context of bystander-liability 
-- 
have been repeatedly addressed and modified by New Mexico case law,I4 there exists little 
guidance from the courts concerning the application of purely traditional elements of NIED." 
Therefore, the absence of prior direction on this topic from the New Mexico courts and 
lo See Madrid. 122 N.M. at 270-71,923 P.2d at 1155-56. 
I 1  - See id. at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 (citing Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,138,909 P.2d 14, 19 
--
(Ct. App. 1995)). 
IZ See id. at 269,923 P.2d at 1 154. 
l 3  =id. -- at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 ("New Mexico precedent is not determinative of this case."). 
" See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393,925 P.2d 510 (1996); Flores v. Baca, 117 
~ . K 3 0 6 , 8 7 1  P.2d 962 (1994); Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992); Folz v. State, 110 
N.M. 457,797 P.2d 246 (1990); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983); Acosta v. Castle 
Constr., Inc., 117 N.M. 28, 868 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1994); Lucero v. Salazar, 117 N.M. 803, 877 P.2d 1106 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Dawson v. Wilheit, I05 N.M. 734,737 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1987); Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 
106 N.M. 628,747 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1987): Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227,668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983). 
15 The court in Madrid made it clear that the case before it was not a bystander-liability case. See Madrid, 122 N.M. 
at 271,923 P.2d at I 156. Notwithstanding, the court spent a considerable portion of its opinion explaining its prior 
bystander-liability decisions because "the Court of Appeals' reliance on bystander cases and their related rationale. 
. require[d] [the Court] to clarify apparent confusion in terminology and in policies applicable to recovery for 
emotional distress." Seeid. The court of appeals' dependence on bystander-liability precedent may be due, in part: 
to the fact that only New Mexico cases addressing bystander liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
exist-precedent addressing non-bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress and "fear of future disease" 
cases do not. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court had previously noted that emotional distress outside the 
bystander context is compensable under traditional principles of negligence. Folz. 1 10 N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at 
260 (citing Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 (Ohio 1987)). 
generalized ignorance about HIV and AIDS impels both a review of the etiology of AIDS'~ and 
- 
an overview of traditional NIED analysis. 
A. The Etiology O~AIDS" 
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is an inevitably fatal infectious disease." 
AIDS first came to the attention of the United States' medical community in 1981 following the 
discovery of several cases of rare skin tumors and lung infections in otherwise healthy 
homosexual men.19 Similar maladies were subsequently observed in intravenous drug users and 
hemophiliacs.20 Taken together, these findings hinted at a blood-borne and sexually transmitted 
infectious entity?' Between 1983 and 1984, French and American scientists independently 
discovered the causative agent-a retrovirus22 now universally known as the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) .~~  Once it gains access to its human host, HIV preferentially 
enters specialized white blood cells (CD4 cells) responsible for defending the body against 
-. pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria, fungi, and v i r ~ s e s ? ~  HIV commandeers the 
metabolic machinery of CD4 cells, turning them into factories for the production of more 
infectious HIV particles-destroying the host cells in the process, and releasing hundreds of new 
l6 See, Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 884 (App. Div. 1996) ("Any 
discussion of the elements of proof of a claim for damages based on the fear of contracting AIDS must be grounded 
on medical facts about the disease and its transmission."). 
" For a thorough scientific and medical overview of HIV and AIDS, see generally Alexandra M. Levine, Acquired 
lmmunodeficiencv Svndrome: The Facts, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 423 (1991). 
See Mervyn F. Silverman, AIDS Medical Education for Lawvers. Judges, and Legislators. in AIDS and the 
courts  27,32 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990). 
l9 See Myron E. Essex, Origin of Acquired Immunodeficienc~ Syndrome. in AIDS: Etiology, Diagnosis, 
~ r z m e n t  and Prevention 3 , 3  (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997); Alvin E. Friedman-Kien & 
Kenneth H. Maya, An Overview of the Acquired lmmunodeficiencv Svndrome. in Color Atlas of AIDS 1 ,2  
(Tracy Tucker ed., 1989); Dennis H. Osmond, Surveillance of U.S. Cases: Characteristics and Trends, in The AIDS 
Knowledge Base 1.2-1, 1.2-1 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
20 See Essex, note 19, at 3. 
21 - See id.. suDra note 19, at 4. 
22 Retroviruses are viruses that are able to insert their own genetic material into the genetic material of cells they 
infect. When the inserted viral genes "turn on," they direct the host cell's own "intracellular machinery" to start 
making more virus particles, which egress from the host and repeat the cycle. HNIAIDS Handbook 70-77 
(Total Learning Concepts, Inc., 3d ed. 1997). 
- " See Friedman-Kien & Mayer, note 19, at 4. 
14 - See Thomas M. Folks & Clyde E. Hart, The Life Cvcle of Human Immunodeficiencv V i s  T w e  I. in AIDS: 
~ t z o g y ,  Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention, note 19, at 29,29-30; see Jay A. Levy, Human 
viruses ready and able to infect more cells.25 This cyclical, exponential depletion of infection- 
- fighting white blood cells leaves the infected individual susceptible to a variety of opportunistic 
infectionsz6 like pneumonia, herpes, and fungal  infection^.^' 
Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms HIV disease and AIDS are not 
synonymous. Rather, HIV infection precedes and eventually leads to the development of AIDS.'~ 
A definitive diagnosis of AIDS requires the combination of confirmed HIV infection and either a 
drop in the CD4 cell count below a certain critical level, or the development of one or more 
"AIDS-associated illnesses.'y29 HIV is transmitted through sexual contact, through blood or blood 
products, or from mother to child during the perinatal period.30 HIV cannot be transmitted from 
lmmunodeficiencv Viruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261 JAMA 2997 (1989) (explaining how HIV infects 
white blood cells). 
" See HNtAIDS Handbook, note 22, at 69-77; Folks & Hart, note 24, a t  29-37. 
26 - Opportunistic infections are caused by pathogens that almost everyone is exposed to, yet only cause severe and 
persistent illnesses in individuals with compromised immune systems. See HIVIAIDS Handbook, note 22, at 
92. See aenerally Lowell S. Young, Omortunistic Infections in the Immunocom~romised Host, in Basic & Clinical 
lmmunology 706,706-09 (Daniel P. Stites et al. eds., 8th ed. 1994). 
27 - See Michael S. Saag, Clinical Spectrum of Human Immunodeficiencv Syndrome Virus Diseases. in AIDS: 
Etiology, Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention, a note 19, at 203,206-08. 
It is incorrect, therefore, to say that one contracts AIDS. Rather, a person contracts HIV and may subsequently 
develop AIDS. w, Vance A. Fink, Jr., Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for Fear of Contractina AIDS: 
Should Plaintiffs Have to Show Emosure to HN?,  99 Dick. L. Rev. 779, 779 (1995) ("An individual will develop 
AIDS only after being infected with [HIV]."); Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: Nealiaent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress and the False-Positive, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1229, 1229 n.5 (1996) (noting that HIV infection and 
AIDS exist along a continuum); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 136-37,909 P.2d 14, 17-18 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citing Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E. 2d 814,815 n.2 (1990)) (explaining how 
the sequelae following initial HIV infection eventually leads to a diagnosis of "full blown" AIDS). See Demis 
H. Osmond, Classifications and Staaine ofHIV Disease, in The AIDS Knowledge Base, - note 19, at 1.1-1, 
1.1-4 (noting that the CDC defmition of AIDS requires confumation of HIV infection). 
29 See HIVIAIDS Handbook. =a note 22, at 85-92. While the presence of  HIV is usually the minimum threshold 
reqGement for a diagnosis of AIDS, an exception exists when HIV is undetectable and yet there exist certain 
AIDS-associated illnesses accompanied by immunosuppression. &id. at 85. AIDS-associated illnesses include a 
variety of bacterial, fungal, and viral infections, see id. at 104, neoplastic diseases, id. at 11 8, and several 
neurologic diseases, see id. at 128-3 1. 
30 See Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert, HIV Infection Among Women and Children and Antidiscrimination 
~ a z  An Overview, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1313, 1316-17 (1992); Jonathan N. Weber & Robin A. Weiss, HIV Infection: 
The Cellular Picture, Sci. Am., Oct. 1988, at 100, 100-09; Gary G. Mathiason & Steven B. Berlin, 
- the Healthcare. Business, and Governmental Workplace, C780 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 633,637-38 (examples of sound 
modes of transmission include use of contaminated needles, sexual intercourse with an HIV-infected individual, 
contact with HIV-contaminated blood or blood products, and transmission from mother to child around the time of  
birth); see generally Sten H. Vemund, Transmission of HIV-1 Among Adolescents and Adults, in AIDS: Etiology, 
Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention, -note 19, at 147, 147-55. 
-6- 
one individual to another by mere casual ~ontac t .~ '  Even the risk of transmission through an 
invasive contact. such as a needle-stick injury, is minimal.32 After initial exposure, the presence 
of the virus can be determined by tests that detect HIV antibodies or components of the virus 
itse1f.3~ However. it may take up to six months after initial infection before a patient tests HIV- 
positive?4 Furthermore, an individual infected with HIV can remain asymptomatic for several 
years. 35 
The public concern over AIDS stems from the arcane nature of the disease, namely: (1) 
HIV may go undetected in the blood for several months; (2) infected individuals may remain 
asymptomatic for several years but still be infectious to others; (3) there exists no effective HIV 
vaccine and no known cure; and (4) HIV infection eventually progresses to AIDS - a condition 
that remains invariably In this regard, AIDS is much like cancer in that both diseases are 
latent, usually fatal conditions that develop at some indeterminable point in time after initial 
- 
exposure to a causative agent?' It is the furtive characteristics of AIDS, coupled with the 
See Harold Jaffe, The Aovlication of Medical Facts to the Courts. in AlDS and the Courts, note 18, at 7, 
17-20; Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiencv Virus, 317 New Eng. 
J. Med. 1125, 1132-33 (1987). 
32 See Richard Denatale & s h a m  D. Parrish, Health Care Workers' Abilih, to Recover in Tort for Transmission or 
~ e r o f  ~ransmission of HIV from a Patient, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 751, 755-56 & 11.15 (1996). 
33 See HIVIALDS Handbook, note 22, at 201-03. 
34 There is a "window" of time between initial exposure to HIV and the production of detectable antibodies. 
Ivan Yip, Note, Aidspbobia and the "Window of Anxietv": Enliehtened Reasoning or Concession to Irrational 
Fear? 60 Brook. L. Rev. 461,470 (1994) (if there are no antibodies detectable by six months it is a "relative 
-+ 
certainty" that the individual is HIV-negative); Jaffe, m note 3 1, at 8-9 (although HIV may be 
undetectable in the blood during the "window" period, the infected individual is still capable of transmitting the 
virus). However, ninety-five percent of HIV-infected patients will test positive within six months of initial exposure 
To the virus. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 n.5 (Minn. 1995). In addition, tests are now available that 
can reliably determine the presence of HIV within four to six weeks of exposure. Mandana Shahvari, Afraids: 
Fear of AlDS as a Cause of Action, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 769,775 (1994). But Julia A. Metcalf et al., Acquired 
Immunodeficiencv Svndrome: Seroloeic and Virologic Tests. in AIDS: Etiology, Diagnosis, Treatment and 
Prevention, - note 19, at 177, 178 (noting that in uncommon cases it has taken up to three years to detect HIV 
using blood tests). 
35 See Jaffe, m note 3 1, at 1 1-12; Gerald Schochetman, Biolow of Human Immunodeficiencv Viruses. in AIDS 
~ e x n g :  Methodology and Management Issues 18,27 (Gerald Schochetman & J. Richard George eds., 1992) 
(noting that HIV may remain in a latency period for up to ten years before symptoms emerge). 
- 
36 See Silverman, note 18, at 31-32; Caitlin A. Schmid, Protecting the Physician in HIV Misdiagnosis Cases, 
46Duke L.J. 431,431 (1996). It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1991, 100,000 people in the United 
States died of AIDS. See id. at 43 1 & n.6. 
37 See Fink, Jr., m note 28, at 779; Brian R. Garves, Fear of AIDS, 3 J. Pharmacy & L. 29,30 (1994). However, 
-
unlike AIDS, cancer may develop due to a genetic predisposition not requiring exposure to a causative agent. 
-7- 
sweeping ignorance regarding HIV transmission, that are mainly responsible for the genesis of 
- the "fear of AIDS" cases." 
B. The Evolution of NIED as a Cause ojilction 
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery where the defendant's 
negligence caused only emotional harm.39 Only when the mental disturbance has occurred in the 
context of an intentional tort involving extreme and outrageous conduct4' calculated to cause 
physical or emotional harm to the victim, have the courts been more willing to allow recovery 4 '  
Under such circumstances, it has generally been required that the distress inflicted be of a 
severity which no reasonable person could be expected to endure.42 
Unlike situations involving intentional conduct, the courts have taken a more prudent 
approach to recognizing compensation for emotional distress claims arising from mere negligent 
c~nduct.~'  The circumspect attitude of the courts to this category of mental disturbance may be 
- 
ascribed to tenuous causal relations, the ability of claimants to easily feign or imagine emotional 
Archibald S. Perkins & George F. Vande Woude, Principles of Molecular Cell Biologv of Cancer: Oncoeenes, in I 
Cancer: Principles & Practice of Oncoloey 35.36 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. Eds., 4th ed. 1993). 
38 See James C. ~ a r o u l i s ,  Note, Can HIV-fikeative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional ~ i s h e s s  Damages for Their Fear 
ofAids?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 225, 226-27 (1993). 
39 See W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts $ 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984); 
~ e x t e m e n t  (Second) of Torts $ 436A (1965) ("If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk 
of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, 
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."). From the beginning, some courts were concerned over the 
potential increase in litigation because emotional dishess was difficult to quantify and recovery of damages relied on 
conjecture and speculation. See Mitchell v. Rochester R.R. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 356 (N.Y. 1896). 
40 Exheme and outrageous conduct has been defmed as conduct "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as ahocious, and utterly intolerable as a civilized community." Restatement (Second) of Torts fj 46 
m t .  d (1965). 
41 Under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress or I.I.E.D. Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 46 
cmt. a (1965); Keeton, a note 39, $ 12, at 60. New Mexico first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, referred to initially as the "law of outrage," in Mantz v. Follinestad, 84 N.M. 473, 479-80, 505 
P.2d 68,74-75 (Ct. App. l972), and subsequently reaffirmed and refined the general principle in a series of 
decisions. %Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376 (1994); Sanders v. 
Lutz, 109 N.M. 193,784 P.2d 12 (1989); Ramirez v. Armshong, 100 N.M. 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983): Andrews v. 
Stallings, 119N.M. 478, 892 P.2d 61 1 (Ct. App. 1995); Stieber v. Journal Publ'g Co., 120 N.M. 270, 901 P.2d 201 
(Ct. App. 1995); Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 848 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1993); Rummel v. Edgemont Realty 
Partners, Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 859 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1993); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (Ct. 
App. 1991); Tmjillo v. Puro, 101 N.M 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984); Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 21 1,638 
-_ P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981). 
41 See Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 46 cmt. j (1965); Domineuez, 97 N.M. at 215,638 P.2d at 427. The New 
-
Mexico Supreme Court announced in Ramirez v. Armstrong that the same standard would henceforth apply to 
unintentional, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 n.1. 
injury, concerns over the potential for spurious and vexatious litigation, and hesitancy to punish 
- 
negligent conduct.44 Therefore, in addition to satisfying the traditional elements of negligence,45 
the courts have generally required proof of more objective criteria in order to guarantee or certify 
that a mental disturbance is, in fact, genuine.46 Over the years, the courts have developed several 
"screening devices" to achieve this 
1.  The "Physical Injury, " "Physical Impact, " "Physical Manifestation, " and 
"Zone of  Danger " Doctrines 
While "[tlhere exists in New Mexico no recognized cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress except for bystander liability"4%ew Mexico has accepted the 
traditional rule that where a defendant causes an actual physical injury to the plaintiff, he is liable 
not only for the physical consequences of his tortious impact but also for the emotional distress 
or mental suffering resulting from it.49 Such emotional distress damages have been traditionally 
referred to as "parasitic" to the "host" claim of damages-they are dependent upon and attach to 
the physical injury.50 Under the physical injury rule, plaintiffs could not sue under a separate tort 
cause of action labeled NIED." Instead, recovely was limited to emotional distress that occurred 
43 See Keeton, note 39, 5 54, at 360. 
44- See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-79 (Mass. 1982); see Keeton, note 39, $54, at 361 
-
("The temporary emotion of fright . . . is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial, that the 
courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere negligence . . . ."). 
OS Namely: duty, breach, causation in fact, proximate causation and injury. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618,625 
(Tern. 1997); Victoria L. Rees, AIDSPhobia: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Com~ensation for Fear of a 
Deadlv Disease, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 241,245-46 (1994); Harris 1. Zakarin, Scared to Death: A Cause of Action for 
AIDS Phobia, 10 Touro L. Rev. 263,267 (1993). 
46 See Keeton, -note 39, $54, at 362. 
47 - See Rees, - note 45, at 268. 
48 - Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306,310,871 P.2d 962,966 (1994). There exists in New Mexico no drafted jury 
instruction for non-bystander NIED. N.M.R.A. Civ. U.J.I. 13-1630 committee comment (1997) ("New Mexico 
law is not sufficiently developed in this area to permit the drafting of a uniform jury instruction."). In this regard, 
New Mexico has followed other jurisdictions in refusing to allow recovery for purely psychic injury, recognizing 
that emotional distress is usually a temporary affliction that is difficult to quantify and relatively easy to feign. See 
Keeton, note 39, $ 54, at 361-63; Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 436A cmt. b (1965). 
49 - See Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471,797 P.2d 246,260 (1990) (citing Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 
(Ohio 1987)); see Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446,451-52,63 1 P.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Ct. App. 1981) (allowing 
recovery for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries); Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 38 1, 
~ - 552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (same). Scholarly writers have long accepted the same. See Keeton, a note 
39 , s  54, at 362-63; Restatement (Second) of Torts 436 (1965). 
50 See Restatement (Second) of Tom 8 436A (1965). 
Mary Donovan, Is the IniurvReauirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of Future Conseauences?, 41 UCLA 
L . ~ v .  1337, 1348-49 (1994). 
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contemporaneously with inflicted injuries.52 Eventually the courts expanded the "physical 
- injury" concept, permitting recovery under an independent tort of NIED provided there was 
some proof of "physical impact."" The impact rule, which limits recovery to plaintiffs who 
could prove that the defendant's negligent conduct caused a "physical impact" or "physical 
h-"34 to the plaintiffs person, became universally recognized by the courts.s5 Presumably due 
to arbitrariness, however, the courts progressively stretched the boundaries of the term "impact," 
allowing recovery for mental distress flowing from innocuous c~ntact . '~  
The terms "physical injury" and "physical impact" are at times treated as synonyms and 
at other times, as antonyms. For example, some commentators and jurisdictions have 
distinguished a "physic,al impact" from a "physical injury,"57 treating the two as distinct and 
separate  occurrence^?^ Other jurisdictions have linked the concepts, requiring that a discernible 
physical injury result from an initial physical impact.59 Still others have treated the terms as 
In addition, rather than just recognizing emotional distress resulting from a physical 
insult, courts permitted recovery for those who could show some subsequent "physical 
52 See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171,176 (Mass. 1982). 
53 - See id. The "impact" rule had its origins in Britain in the nineteenth century. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 Eng. Rep. 
-- 
557 (H.L. 1861); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P C. 1888) (appeal taken from Vict.). 
Although the rule was subsequently overturned in Britain a short time later, see Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 
(1901), by then it had already been adopted by the American courts, see Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 
(N.Y. 1896) Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897). See Archibald H. Throckmorton, 
Damages for Fright, 34 Haw. L. Rev. 260,264-65 (1921) (discussing the adoption of the rule in several other U.S. 
jurisdictions). 
54 The extent of the physical harm required under the rule varies. See,, Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 
(3d Clr. 1978) (fmding that dormant bacterial infection satisfies requirement); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 
639 S.W.2d 431 (T~M.  1982) (finding that ingestion of contaminated water satisfied requirement despite absence of 
physical symptomology). See Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728,734 (Md. 1979) (stating that aphysical harm 
must be verifiable by "objective determination"). 
55 See Keeton, -note 39, § 54, at 363. 
56 See -- id. at 363-64 & nn.43-53. 
- 
"See, Robert C. Bollinger, On the Road to Recovery for EmotionalHarm: Is the Fear of AIDS a Legally 
Compensable In iw? ,  16 J. Legal Med. 417,424 (1995). 
58 - ~- a, Wetherill v. ~niveriicy of chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. 111. 1983). 
-. 
59 uR.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360,362 (Fla. 1995); Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922,925 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452,454 (Ind. 1991)). See Fink, note 
28, at 78 1 (discussing the requirement of an accompanying physical injury resulting from an initial impact). 
manifestation"attributab1e to their emotional di~tress.~' Eventually, a handful of courts 
.- -. altogether abandoned the requirement of ~hysical harm and recogn~zed an independent cause of 
action for NIED.~' However, many of these same courts subsequently retreated from this 
position, eschewing NIED as an independent cause of action and narrowing the circumstances 
under which the absence of physical harm would still permit recovery.63 
In lieu of the physical impact mle, some jurisdictions employ a "zone of dangeP test, 
which depends upon the proximity of the plaintiff to the risk of harm created by the defendant's 
negligent conduct.64 In this context, "zone of danger" refers to those persons who are subjected 
to the risk of physical harm from the defendant's conduct and who fear for their own sarety,6' as 
opposed to thosepersons within the range of potential risk but whose emotional distress results 
from witnessing the harm to another (bystander-liability).66 However, in most jurisdictions, 
recovery for bystander-liability is no longer limited by the plaintiffs presence within the "zone 
p~ 
6o See. ex., Marchica v. Long Island RR, 3 1 F.3d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir. 1994); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,470-71, 
797 P.2d 246,259-60 (1990). 
See Restatement (Second) of Torts $8 436,436A (1965); Marchica. 31 F.3d at 1203. 
62 - See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps,, 616 P.2d 813,8 14 (Cal. 1980); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509,520 (Haw. 
1970); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765,772 (Mo. 1983); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649,650 
(Tex. 1987). As a limiting device, most courts required thatthe mental disturbance be objectively serious. 
R o d r i ~ u e ~  472 P.2d at 520 ("[Slerious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, 
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress . . . ."). 
" - See Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 13 
(1992); Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278,281-82 (Cal. 1989) (limiting 
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980)). While physical harm was no longernecessary, other 
circumstances were required to establish the breach of a duty owed. In the absence of physical injury, recovery 
would be permitted if the mental disturbance "result[ed] from the breach of a duty owed the plaintiff that is assumed 
by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of  law, or that arises out of a relationship between the 
two." Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 (emphasis added); see Boyles v. Ken, 855 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1993) 
(establishing that a duty may arise kom a statute, the common law, or from the actions of the parties). For example, 
recovery of damages for pure emotional distress, absent physical impact or manifestation, has been allowed in the 
context of physician-patient relationships, see Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 n.5, and where a contractual duty exists, 
w, Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306,31 I, 871 P.2d 962,966 (1994) (mental distress arising from the breach of a 
funeral contract), Chavez v. Manville Prods. Carp., 108 N.M. 643,777 P.2d 371 (1989) (emotional distress 
resulting from retaliatory discharge in breach of an employment contract). See Karen L. Chadwick, m f  
AIDS: The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Recognition of a Dutv to Prevent Emotional Distress Bevond Traditional 
&g&, 25 N.M. L. Rev. 143, 149-52 (1995) (noting that "direct" liability doesn't require physical harm or 
bystander status provided that a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant establishes a duty to 
- grevent emotional harm). 
See Marchica, 3 1 F.3d at 1203. 
65 - See Sarah W. Thompson, Note, Actual Physical Peril: The New Element to Ohio's Prima Facie Case For 
~ e z e e n c e ? ,  25 Cap. U. L. Rev. 993,995 (1996). 
66 - See Restatement (Second) of Torts 5s 3 13(2), 436(3) (1965). 
of danger."67 While the development of the "zone of danger" rule seemingly ameliorated h e  
harshness of the impact rule, several courts still required that emotional distress be demonstrated 
by some physical rnanife~tation.~~ 
In New Mexico, the term "zone of danger" has different meanings depending upon the 
context in which it is used by the courts. For example, in the case of bystander-liability, New 
Mexico does not require that a plaintiff be within the "zone of danger" in order to recover for 
emotional distress from witnessing the peril or harm to another.69 In thls setting, the phrase 
describes those "persons having some physical proximity to the tortfea~or."'~ While rejected a s  a 
rule for bystander recovery, the term is, nohetheless, used by the New Mexico courts as a general 
test of foreseeability: "a description of the class of persons that a reasonable person would 
conclude based on the circumstances was subject to a risk by the defendant's acts or 
omissions."" 
- Outside of bystander-liability, most courts continue to apply the physical injury, physical 
impact and the physical manifestation rules - alone or in combination - to NIED claims. Such 
limiting devices satisfy the need for an objective check on the legitimacy of emotional injuries, 
providing a guarantee of genuineness.72 However, the desire of the courts to preserve authentic 
67 See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982) (and cases cited therein). 
68- u,Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 403,406 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Williams v. Baker, 572 
A.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. 1990) (and cases cited therein); Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867,875 (Minn. 
1986). 
69 See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538,542,673 P.2d 822,826 (1983) (adopting the rule established in Dillon 
&, 441 P.2d 912,920-21(Cal. 1968), with the additional requirement thatthe plaintiff show some phys~cal 
manifestation of his or her emotional distress). Ramirez was subsequently modified by Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 
471,797 P.2d 246,260 (1 990) (abolishing requirement of subsequent physical manifestation of emotional trauma). 
70 See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,274,923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996). 
7' E(explaining how the phrase "zone of danger" was used in Cakins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61.792 P.2d 
36,38 (1990)). 
72 - See Keeton, note 39, 1 54, at 361. In addition to providing indicia of genuineness, the physical 
injury/impact~manifestation rules are primarily used to establish duty and causation. See, ex., PaGon, 437 N.E.2d at 
180 ("[E]motional distress is reasonably foreseeable when there is a causal relationship between the physical injuries 
suffered and the emotional distress alleged."). In the bystander-liability context, however, the injury;impact and 
physical manifestation rules have almost universally been abandoned. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
Buell, 480 U.S. 557,570 11.20 (1987); see also Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157 (explaining the holding 
from &, 1 10 N.M. at 471, 797 P.2d at 260, that a bystander need not suffer an initial physical impact nor a 
subsequent physical manifestation to recover damages for emotional dismss). 
claims for emotional distress at the expense of invalid ones has resulted in "inconsistency and 
- incoherence" in the application of these rules.73 
2.  "Fear ofFurure Dlsease" Doctrine 
Because AIDS only became a recognized disease in 1981:~ recovery of NIED damages 
for fear of developing AIDS remains a novel remedy, providing fertile ground for debate. 
Consequently, most courts have relied upon the rationale and analysis from the "fear of future 
di~ease"'~ cases for guidance.76 For nearly a century, recovery for emotional distress arising from 
a fear of contracting a disease in the future has been recognized where the defendant's 
negligence gave rise to the fear.77 The majority of early cases "involved fears that were 
necessarily short-lived."" It wasn't until the rise in toxic tort litigation79 that actions for more 
latent conditions such as "fear of cancer"80 became more commonplace Cases analyzing fear 
,- - 73 See Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,440 (Tern. 1996). The frustration in discerning and applying the various 
ruKwas  perhaps best expressed in Hunslev v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. 1976), wheren the court stated: 
"Any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed perplexity." 
74 See Marsha F. Goldsmith, "Critical Moment" at Hand in HIVIAIDS Pandemic. New Global Sha t e~v  to Arrest its 
~ m y d  Prowsed, 268 JAMA 445 (1992). 
7' For an overview of American tort law regarding emotional distress as an element of recoverv in future disease. see 
generally David Carl Minneman, Annotation, ~ u 6 r e  Disease or Condition, or AnxieN  ela at ink Thereto, as ~ l e m e n t  
of Recovew, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13 (1986). 
76 See Edward M. Slaughter, AIDS phobia: The Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fear ofAIDS, 16 U. Haw. 
~ . i i i v .  143, 154 (1995). 
n &&&, Jones v. United R.Rs., 202 P. 919,922-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) (fear of future disability): Figlar v. 
Gordon, 53 A.2d 645,648 (Conn. 1947) (fear of developing epilepsy); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 
152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (fear of dying from glass In the stomach); Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (fear of blood poisoning); Walker v. Boston & Maine R.R., 51 A. 918,919 W.H. 1902) (fear of 
going insane); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885,886 (N.C. 1912) (fear of developing cancer from 
severe bums); Ward Baking Co. v. Triuino, 161 N.E. 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (fear from swallowing needles); 
Southern Kan. Ry. v. McSwain, 118 S.W. 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (fear of blood poisoning); Elliott v. 
Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32,32-33 (Wash. 1928) (fear ofhaving a miscarriage). As a general rule, the early courts held 
that one who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which another contracts, is liable in 
damages, provided the feared disease actually develops. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334,340 (Wyo. 1979) (and 
cases cited therein): 39 Am. Jur. 26 Health 6 48 (I 9681. 
-" 
78 Terry ~ o r e h e a d ~ w o r k i n ,  Fear of Disease and ~ e l i y e d  Manifestation Iniuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 
53 Fordham L. Rev. 527.542 & n.121 (1984). 
79 For an historical overview ofthe emerioncdof mxic tort litigation, see generally Arvin Maskin, et al., Overview 
and U~da te  of Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, C837 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 629 (1993). 
80 Fear of cancer cases began to appear in the middle ofthis century. See,, Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 
(E.D. Pa. 1951) (fear of developing breast cancer); Flood v. Smith, 13 A.2d 677 (Corn. 1940) (same); Kimbell v. 
Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, writ refd n.r.e.) (same). Some courts and commentators have referred 
to the anxiety of developing cancer as "cancerphobia." Gale & Goyer, note 5, at 724-25. The term 
"cancerphobia" was first used to describe a person's fear of developing cancer in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 
249,251 (N.Y. 1958). However, "cancerphobia" and "fear of cancer" are distinct. The former refers to a phobic 
of developing cancer have usually involved exposure to asbestos fibers,82 diethylstilbestrol 
A (DES),~' and other potential carcinogens or chemical toxins.84 Before permitting compensation 
for fear of developing a disease at some point in the future, the courts have required that one or 
more of the traditional tests for NIED be satisfied8'- such as proof of a discernible physical 
86 injury, or proof of physical impact or physically invasive contact,'' and objective proof of 
reasonable fear.88 For the courts, fulfillment of these criteria provided objective proof of "actual 
reaction in the absence of objective evidence, while the latter refers to an anxiety caused by the fear of developing 
cancer, but is not a mental illness. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 805 n.5 (Cal. 1993). 
See Glen Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefmed, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 11 13, 
-
I1 13 (1995). Traditionally, fear of cancer was analyzed by the courts as a subset of "nosophobia, the general fear of 
diseases." id. 
'' See. e.a,Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v, lohns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985); Durn 
v. Owens-Coming Fibergalss, 774 F. Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991); Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 
(D. Haw. 1990); Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 
A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mauro v. 
Raymark Indus., lnc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1985). Inhalation of ashestos fibers may lead to a variety of pulmonary disorders, including asbestosis and 
- 
lung cancer. Potts v. Celotex Cop., 796 S.W.2d 678,679 & n.2 (Tenn. 1990). See generally Barry I. 
Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects I (4th ed. 1996): Nancy Campbell Brown, Note, Predicting the 
Future: Present Mental Anguish for Fear of Develo~ing Cancer in the Future as a Result of Past Asbestos Ex~osure, 
23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 337 (1993). 
83 See McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. 111. 1986); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. 
S U I  1553 (N.D. 111. 1983); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111. 1978); Plummer v. Abbon 
Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920 @.R.I. 1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1981). DES was an 
experimental drug widely administered to pregnant woman because it purportedly reduced the risk of miscarriages. 
S e e m  437 N.E.Zd at 172. DES has been identified as a causative agent in the development of cancer of the 
- 
reproductive organs in daughters of the women who took DES. &id. 
81  a, Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 1219 @. Mass. 1986); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990); Potter v. Firestone T i e  & 
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); Ayers v. 
Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); (all involving fear of developing cancer from 
exposure to chemically contaminated drinking water); Anderson v. Welding Testing lab., Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 
1974) (fear of ~ost-irradiation cancer): Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (same). 
"see ~ o n e r ,  863 P.2d at 805. See generally Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over ~ o d ; :  'l'rends ~ecardin; the Phvsical lniury 
Requirement in Neeliaent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of D~sease" Cases, 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. I 
( 19971 ,.. ,-
86 " a, Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401,410-14 (N.J. 1962) (fear of cancer resulting from chemical 
bum injury). 
The physical impact requirement is usually satisfied by objective evidence of exposure to the disease-causing 
agent, irrespective of resulting symptomology. See,, Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
(infectious bacteria entering the body); &&, 460 F. Supp. 713 (ingestion of DES); M, 639 S.W.Zd 431 
(ingestion of contaminated drinking water); m, 761 F.2d 1129 (mbalat~on of asbestos fibers), But see Potter, 
863 P.2d at 81 1 (holding that a toxic ingest~on or exposure, without more, does not provide an actionable claim for 
fear of developing a future illness). 
-- 
88 See Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A.2d 1078 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). For an in-depth overview of the parameters 
-
utilized by courts to assess the objective reasonableness ofmental anguish see, Dworkin, note 76, at 561-63. 
In the asbestos exposure cases, the courts have allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate the reasonableness oftheir fears by 
permitting expert medical testimony as to the probability of developing cancer and the requirement for medical 
surveillance. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 495 A.2d 495,499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
exposure" to a disease-causing entity, a general prerequ~site to re~overy.'~ The policy underlying 
the "proof of exposure" requirement is that no reasonable person would feat contracting a future 
disease without some medically objective evidence of actual exposure to a disease-causing 
agent. 90 
Consequently, "fear of hture disease" cases provide instructive precedent concerning the 
causal links between exposure, injury, and rec~very.~ '  In its reasoning, however, the Madrid 
court largely ignored this panoply of "fear of future disease" precedent. Instead, the court opted 
for basic tort doctrine analysis, and declined to accept the reasoning developed and adopted by 
the majority of other jurisdictions. 
IV. RATIONALE 
A. Madrid Adopts the "Impact " Rule and Rejects the Majoriiy "Actual Exposure" 
Test 
The Madrid decision permits recovery on a cause of action for emotional distress based 
- 
upon a negligently created fear of developing AIDS without requiring threshold proof of actual 
exposure to HIV, provided a medically sound channel of transmission exists?' Inother words, it 
is irrelevant whether the alleged conduit of HIV-bloody fluids in the Madrid case-actually 
89 Most case law has required that a plaintiff not only demonstrate a physical injury, but also actual exposure. 
a, Harper v. lllinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 11 39, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no recovery for emotional 
distress absent evidence of exposure to disease-causing agent). See Fink, Jr., note 28, at 785 ("[Tlhe 
injury requirement often means 'exposure' to a disease-causing agent."); Rees, note 45, at 264 ("All plaintiffs 
alleging emotional distress due to the fear of contracting a future disease must prove exposure to a disease-causing 
agent before allegations of emotional distress will be considered even remotely compensable."). 
90 See. ex., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-70 @. Haw. 1990) (noting that exposure 
provides objective evidence of connection between physical harm and emotional distress). Without such limiting 
devices, the "task of discerning fraudulent 'fear o f  [disease] claims from meritorious ones would be 'prodigious."' 
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Ayers v. Jackson, 461 
A.2d 184, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983)). m N e s o m  v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208,210 (5th Cir. 
1993) (requiring proof of exposure only in the absence of physical injury or contact). 
see,, Games, note 37, at 30 (noting that the similarity between AIDS and cancer has resulted in courts 
analyzing such cases with similar standards); John Patrick Darby, Tort Liabilitv for the Transmission ofthe AIDS 
Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prosvective AIDS, 45 Wash. I Lee L. Rev. 185, 188 (1988) ("Because of 
similarities between HIV and carcinogens, courts analyzing liability for transmitting HIV should examine a 
,~--. defendant's liability under established law for exposing a plaintiff to a carcinogen."). See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 
881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("The similarities between terminal cancer and A I D S t h e i r  latent manifestation 
and their deadly, incurable nature-have led courts and commentators to analyze actions for fear of contracting 
AIDS under the same standards as actions for fear of developing cancer.") 
92 See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,278, 923 P.2d 1154, 1163 (1996). 
-
contains HIV, or is otherwise HIV-infected. According to w, ir cannot be concluded "as a 
- 
matter of law that at the time a person is negligently exposed to a disease-transmitting agent 
(blood) through a medically sound channel of transmission (open wounds) a fear of contracting 
AIDS is irrationa~."~~ 
In its reasoning, the Madrid court relied on traditional tort principles that were formulated 
well before the advent of unique diseases like A I D S . ~ ~  Specifically, the court determined that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recovery because she suffered a "physical impact" as a result of the 
Medical Center's negligent conduct?' Recruiting the opinion from Folz v. State, the Madrid 
court reasoned that "emotional . . . injuries which have arisen as a proximate result96 of the 
defendant[s'] tortious act are compensable under the traditional rule for recovery. The tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him, the effect of his tortious act upon the person being the measure 
of damages."97 Applying this traditional rubric, the court concluded that limiting recovery by 
7. 
requiring threshold proof of "actual exposure" is unnecessary because "[ilt is the invasive 
'impact' of the bloody fluid that gives rise to Madrid's claim for damages under the general rule 
that emotional injuries suffered by the victim of tortious impact are reco~erable."~~ 
The Madrid court refused to impose the majority "actual exposure" rule as a limiting 
device.'' It cautioned that such a rule would require plaintiffs to prove both that the conduit of 
disease transmission carried HIV, and that a medically sound channel of transmission existed.Io0 
Instead, the court held that once "impact" with the alleged conduit of disease transmission was 
93 See id. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161. 
94-- For example, the impact rule made its debut in the late nineteenth century, see., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. 
Co., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897), nearly one hundred years before the first case of AIDS was diagnosed. 
95 - See Madrid. 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157. For this reason the court found it unnecessary to analyze NED 
cases not involving a physical impact. id. 96 In its opmion, the M a  Court does not directly address whether the impact with bloody fluid satisfies causation. 
The Court intimates, however, that the impact makes the emotional injury a foreseeable consequence. See id. at 274, 
923 P.2d at 1154. 
97 
- -- See id. at 272 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471, 797 P.2d246,260 (1990)). 
9s -- See id. (citing Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197,1204 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Marchica court held that 
where a plaintiff "suffer[~] an actual physical injury. . . the rule governing fear of future disease is inapposite and 
the traditional negligent infliction of emotional distress analysis applies." 31 F 3d at 1204. 
99 See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157. 
-- 
shown, only proof that a medically sound channel of transmission existed would be required.''' 
- In Madrid, blood coming into contact with unhealed paper cuts on the plaintiffs hands was cited 
as the viable channel of transrnissi~n.''~ For the court, a rule requiring proof of amedically 
sound channel of transmission, regardless of the presence of HIV, sufficiently limits potential 
liability yet permits the adjudication of genuine claims.lo3 In support of its reasoning, the court 
quoted from the opinion in Williamson v. Waldman:104 
[Wlhere a defendant's negligent act or omission provides an 
occasion from which a reasonable apprehension of contracting a 
deadly disease may eventuate, and where the aualitv of the conduct 
is such to crcate a ~ s u m ~ t i o n  f exvosure, the resulting claim for 
damages by reason of emotic~nal injury may not be dismissed . . . 
10s 
Implicit in the Madrid court's holding is that claims for emotional distress arising from a 
fear of possibly developing AIDS are to be limited to the time period between the alleged 
. . 
exposure incident, and the receipt of conclusive test results demonstrating that the plaintiff is 
 negative."^ This so-called "window of anxiety" rule originated in those few jurisdictions 
that, like Madrid, rejected the "actual exposure" test.''' The "window of anxiety" was defined by 
the Madrid court as a period of up to six months because "[ulnder the current state of medical 
knowledge, the absence of actual HIV infection will be known within six months after an 
'"See id, at 275,923 P.2d at 1 160. 
lo' =id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162. 
102-- & at270,923 P.2d at 1155. & Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ch., 121 N.M. 133, 141,909 P.2d 14, 
22 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts, if proven, to demonstrate that the exposure incident 
includes a medically sound method of transmission through the unhealed paper cuts on her hands . . . .). The Madrid 
court also made it clear that where no medically sound channel of hansmission exists, no claim for emotional 
dishess will lie. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1162. 
Irn See id. a t  275, 923 P.2d at 1160. 
6 T I x 2 d  1179, 1180-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. AOP. Div. 1996). 
105 See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,92j P.2d at i i 5 9  (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1180-81) 
-- 
I N  -- See id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1 162 
107 See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997); DeMilio v. 
- - 
~chrager, 666 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995); Tischlerv. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1994). However, several 
jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" test have also incorporated the "window of anxiety" rule. 
Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253,256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 
N.Y.S.2d 880,887 (App. Div. 1996); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Sews., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 
(Tenn. 1993). See generally Yip, -note 34. 
exposure incident."lo8 The rationale beh~nd the six-month time limit is that "emotional-distress 
- damages must be based upon fears experienced by a reasonable and well-informed person."'0g 
Accordingly, after the "window of anxiety" has passed, reasonable and well-informed persons 
should no longer experience continuing emotional distress because they know or should know 
that they are not HIV-infected.'" Any persisting fear would be unreasonable in that it would no 
longer be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.'" 
Finally, in addition to the rules it articulated specifically addressing the possible exposure 
to HIV, the Court noted that recovery of en~otional distress damages for fear of developing AIDS 
would still require proof of all the traditional elements of a negligence cause of action.'I2 
Therefore, under the Madrid decision recovery of damages in aNIED claim for fear of 
developing AIDS requires proof of: (1) a physical impact (exposure incident) between the 
possible disease-transmitting agent and the plaintiff, (2) a medically sound channel of 
transmission existing contemporaneously with the exposure incident, (3) awareness by the 
plaintiff that the exposure incident created a possibility of contracting a deadly disease, (4) 
enduring ignorance on the part of the plaintiff as to whether or not he or she was actually 
exposed to a deadly disease, (5) emotional distress arising during the "window of anxiety," and 
(6) all the elements of a traditional claim for negligence.'I3 In short, "[olnly those persons whose 
conduct departs from the standard of reasonable care and results in an exposure through a 
medically sound channeI of transmission will be held liable."'14 
B. Rejecting the ''Actual Exposure" Test Advances the Policy ofDeferring 
Unreasonable Conducf 
I" B, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P 2d at 1162. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,137, 
909 P.2d 14, 18 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Ninety-five percent of HIV-infected individuals will test HIV positive within six 
months of the date of exposure.") 
log See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23. 
'''See id.; Madrid, 121 N.M. a t  142,909 P.2d at 23. 
"I gad rid,^ N.M. at 142, 909 P.2d at 23. 
' I Z  See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162 
113- The required elements were derived by combining the supreme court's conclusion, seeid. at 278,923 P.2d at 
1163, with the holding from the court of appeals, see Madrid. 121 N.M. at 143,909 P.2d at 24. 
'I4 See Madr~d, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162. 
In its opinion, the Madrid court addressed a number of concerns that have been raised as 
- 
,justification for adoption of the majority actual exposure test.' ' j  Posited concerns have included 
the possibility of increased liability and medical malpractice insurance premiums, excessive 
litigation premised on irrational fears, decreased compensation for those victims who actually 
contract HIV and subsequently develop AIDS, and the creation of an unworkable rule that leads 
to inconsistent results and discourages settlen~ents."~ In addressing these policy concerns, the 
Madrid court distinguished its reasoning from that formulated in the "fear of cancer" cases 
wherein many of the same considerations were involved. 
First, the Madrid court evaluated the reasoning from Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
&'I7 In w, the California Supreme Court considered whether emotional distress arising 
from a fear of developing cancer in the future as a result of exposure to carcinogens permits 
recovery of damages in anegligence action."' The plaintiffs in Potter discovered that 
- 
carcinogenic chemicals had contaminated their domestic water wells as a result of the 
defendant's negligent operation of a nearby toxic waste site.'I9 The plaintiffs were subsequently 
exposed to carcinogens via their ingestion of the contaminated water supply.'20 While not 
addressing whether the ingestion of carcinogens qualified as a "physical impact," the m r  court 
noted that it lacked a factual basis to decide whether the ingestion had resulted in a physical 
injury to which parasitic damages for emotional distress could attach.I2' Regardless, the m r  
court, relying on its former decisions, eschewed the physical injury requirement as a "hopelessly 
imprecise screening device."'2z Instead, the court focused on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs 
'I5 See id. at 275, 923 P.2d at 1162 
... 
--
"' See id. 
' I 7  863 E d  795 (Cal. 1993). 
' I 8  -- See id. at 805.' 
- ' I 9  See id. at 801-02. 
120 -- See id. at 808. 
12, -- See id. at 807. Other courts have found that exposure to toxins resulting in immune system impairment or 
--
subcellular damage qualifies as a physical injury. See id. at 806 (and cases cited therein). 
12* -- See id. at 810. 
fear in developing cancer in the future due to a toxic exposure. 12' The court concluded that in the 
absence of physical injury or illness, recovery of damages for fear of cancer should only be 
allowed if the plaintiff can demonstrate that it is medically "more likely than not" that cancer 
will develop in the future due to the toxic exposure.'24 The court reasoned that a carcinogenic 
ingestion or exposure, without more, does not provide a reasonable basis for fearing future 
disease attributable to the exposure.'25 From a policy standpoint, the m r  court was concerned 
about unreasonable claims based upon speculative fears and the magnitude of the potential class 
of plaintiffs because "all of us are exposed to carcinogens every day" and, therefore, "[a]U of us 
are potential fear of ~ancer~laint i f fs ." '~~ 
The "more likely than not" standard from was subsequently applied in a "fear of 
AIDS" case by the California Court of Appeals in Kerins v. ~art1ey.I~' Inw, the plaintiff 
brought a cause of action for NIED after learning that her physician, who had performed an 
- invasive surgical operation on her, was HIV-infected.'28 Following the direction given by the 
California Supreme Court in W r ,  the Kerins court held that: 
[I]n the absence of physical injury or illness, damages for fear of 
AIDS may be recovered only if the plaintiff is exoosed to HIV or 
AIDS as a result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty 
owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs fear stems from a 
knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, 
that it is more likely than not he or she will become HIV 
seropositive and develop AIDS due to the exposure."'29 
123 See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,810 (Cal. 1993). 
I" See id. at 800. 
, A ,  See id. at 811. 
See -- id. at 8 1 1-12. The Madrid court excerpted the same quotes from Potter in its opinion. Madrid v.  Lincoln 
Countv Med. Ctr.. 122 N.M. 269.275.923 P2d 1154. 1160 (1996). 
- '*' 33 kal. Rptr. 2d 172 (1994). TWO additional ~alifdmia cases have also applied the Potter standard in the "fearof 
AIDS" context. Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (1995): Herbert v. Regenls ofUniv. of 
Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (1994). 
I2'See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174-75. 
I29 Id. at 179 (emphasis added). 
-
The Kerins Court concluded that the plaintiffs likelihood of developing AIDS was a 
- 
"most speculative possibility"'30 and, therefore, any fear of developing AIDS in the future was, 
as a matter of law, unreasonable.I3' In support of its decision, the Kerins court echoed the same 
policy concerns expressed in the Potter decision-namely, effects on the cost and availability of 
malpractice insurance, excessive litigation, and the adequacy of compensation for those who 
actually develop AIDS as a result of negligent c~nduct . "~  
Without much elaboration, the Madrid court distinguished its reasoning from that in 
-, noting that while it is true that each of us are exposed to carcinogens every day, not all of 
us are exposed to HIV everyday.133 And while there exists much less medical certainty when and 
if one will develop cancer after exposure to a carcinogen,134 HIV infection-and, therefore, one's 
propensity to develop A 1 D k a n  be ruled out within six months of the initial exposure 
incident.I3' Therefore, unlike the indefinite period of time involved in toxic exposure cases, the 
- time period during which emotional distress may arise after a possible HIV exposure incident is 
confined to six months.'j6 By implication then, concerns over the magnitude of the class of 
potential plaintiffs and the resultant flood of litigation are not the same in the "fear of AIDS" 
context as they are in the "fear of cancer" context.13' 
The Madrid court also distinguished its opinion from the Kerins decision. The court noted 
that under its rule, it too would have dismissed the plaintiffs claim in Kerins because in that 
case, unlike Madrid, no medically sound channel of transmission was present.'38 In-, the 
absence of HIV exposure through a medically sound channel of transmission, in part, made the 
Id. 
-
"' See id. at 180. 
132-- See id. at 178-79 (also referred to in m, 122 N.M. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161) 
--
'33 See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162. 
134 See potter-v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 81 1 (Cal. 1993). 
135 See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162. 
See id. 
'"'X -- 
plaintiffs fears unreasonable under the "more likely than not" standard.'39 o n  the contrary, for 
A the Madrid court. one's fear of developing AIDS after an exposure incident involving contact 
with blood and unhealed wounds was not irrati0na1.l~~ Therefore, the &&&id court adjudged the 
policy concerns expressed in and subsequently adopted in w, as less compelling in 
the fear of AIDS context, especially when a medically sound channel of transmission exists.I4' 
As a result, the court found it unnecessary to employ the "actual exposure" test as a limiting 
device because it agreed with the argument that "with the channel of transmission test . . . there 
is little likelihood of disaster in the recognition of a cause of action for genuine cases of 
emotional distress."'42 
The primary policy objective advanced by the court's niling was the deterrence of 
unreasonable conduct.'43 The court felt that given "the deadly nature of the AIDS virus, 
reasonable care should be encouraged . . . in the handling of potential disease-transmitting agents 
- 
such as blood."'44 The court reasoned that imposing potential liability upon those whose conduct 
may create a risk of exposure to innocent persons would encourage reasonable care and deter 
others from engaging in unreasonable conduct.145 The court concluded that to the extent this 
deterrence scheme reduces exposure incidents, "recognition of a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress serves the laudable goal of promoting public health.'"46 Insofar as 
concerns over the impact of its ruling upon the costs of malpractice insurance, availability of 
See id. In Kerins, the operating physician employed universal precautions and there was no evidence to suggest 
that he sustained any cuts during the operation. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174, 177 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179. 
140 See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 276, 923 P.2d at 1161. The court supported its contention that such feats are reasonable 
by citing N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 24-1-9.1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996) - a  statute permitting the testing of persons convicted 
of certain criminal offenses for sexually-transmitted diseases. See Madrid 122 N.M. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161 n.2. 
The court reasoned that because the statute permits HIV testing of criminal sex offenders, the New Mexico 
Legislature has recognized that "under circumstances in which a channel of transmission exists" fears in those 
yersons potentially exposed to sexually transmitted disease are "to be expected." See id. 
- 
See id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162. 
142 - 
A". 
I" See id. (citing Trujillo v. City ofAlbuquerque. 110 N.M. 621,798 P.2d 571 (1990)). 
'" 4 2 (emphasis added). 
'45 -- See id. 
health care services, and the financial resources of defendants, the court responded that such 
- trepidations amount to unsupported c~njecture.'~' TO that end, the court remarked: "[blecause 
important policy goals are firthered by recognizing a cause of action for emotional distress from 
an invasive impact caused by negligence, we will not rely on unsubstantiated predictions of an 
insurance crisis as grounds for defeating such a cause of action."'48 
V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Madrid Decision Expands [he Impact Rule Beyond Traditional Bounds 
1. Misapplication of a Basic Tort Maxjm 
The Madrid court treated their holding as nothing more than the reaffirmation of the basic 
tort maxim: "[tlhe tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him."'49 This adage, however, 
originated £rom and has been used to illustrate the "eggshell skull" or "thin-skulled" plaintiff 
doctrine.'50 Under the eggshell skull doctrine the tortfeasor is liable for unforeseeable injuries, 
,--. but only to the extent that his negligent conduct has resulted in the a~a-avation of a pre-existing 
conditi~n.'~' This fundamental principle also exists under New Mexico law.'52 Additionally, the 
rule applies equally to both emotional and physical injurie~."~ 
' 4 6 ~ a d r i d  v. Lincoln County Med. Ca., 122 N.M. 269,277,923 P.2d 1154,1162 (1996). 
147 See id. 
K a z 7 8 . 9 2 3  P.2d at 1163. 
149 See id. at272, 923 P.2d at 1157 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471,797 P.2d246,260 (1990)). 
 lieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901); see Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 
1366,1372 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The eggshell plaintiff rule simply means that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he fmds 
hi."); Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The tortfeasor takes his victim as he 
finds him . . . thatis the eggshell-skull rule."): Pierce v. General Motors Colp., 504 N.W.2d 648,656 (Mich. 1993) 
("All first-year law students are taught that a tortfeasor 'takes his victim as he finds him,' and are given the example 
of 'the man with the eggshell skull!); Casey v. Frederickson Motor Express Coy., 387 S.E.2d 177, 179 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1990) ("The thin skull rule is the rule of law that a negligent defendant takes the plaintiff as he fmds him . . . 
."); Pace v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 594 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1991) ("This is the rule that the defendant 
takes the plaintiff as he fmds him, or the 'thin skull' or 'eggshell skull' rule."); see generally Restatement (Second) of 
Torts 8 461 (1964); Keeton, -note 39, 4 43, at 292, 5 54, at 363 11.37; 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 5 500 
(1989). 
IS1 See Keeton, note 39, 5 43, at 292; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 5 922 & 11.67 (1989). Prior to Madrid, the only 
casesthat have used the phrase "the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him" to illustrate the eggshell doctrine 
-.~ or the aggravation of a pre-existinginjury are Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 (Ohio 1987), m, 110 
N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at 260, and HOD SO^ v. St. Mary's HoS~ital, 408 A.2d 260,264 (Cow. 1979). The latter case 
involved an action for loss of consortium. See Hoason, 408 A.2d at 264. 
Is2 See Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 N.M. 301,306,336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959); Martinez v. 
~eaze ,96N.M.446,451 ,631  P.2d 1314, 1319(Ct. App. 1 9 8 1 ) . ~ T h o m a s v . H e n s o n ,  102N.M.417,423, 
Application of the eggshell skull doctrine "does not create a new class of plaintiffs."'54 
- Rather, it merely prohibits a defendant from eluding liability where his negligent conduct results 
in otherwise unforeseeable harm that would not have occurred but for the plaintiffs inherent 
susceptibility to Therefore, under the eggshell skull rule a plaintiff predisposed to 
psychological trauma is not precluded from recovery for emotional distress resulting from a 
physical injury just because an individual more nom~ally constituted would not have suffered a 
similar harm.'56 Paradoxically, the Madrid court employed "eggshell skull" terminology despite 
an absence of facts that the plaintiff possessed any predisposition to emotional harm or that the 
defendant's conduct exacerbated any underlying preexisting conditions (emotional or physical), 
if indeed the plaintiff had any. While the plaintiff in Madrid did have pre-existing paper cuts, no 
explanation or analogous precedent was offered by the court to support the contention that 
emotional distress represents an exacerbation or aggravation of this type of injury. In any case, 
- 
when the eggshell doctrine has been employed, at least the courts have ~equired that any injury 
be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct.'57 Attention to 
proximate causation was lacking in the Madrid decision, however. 
2. A "Physical Impact" Resulting in an "Actual Exposrrre" Satisjies 
Proximate Causation by Making the Fear of Contracting HIV Foreseeabte 
and Reasonable 
a The "Actual Exposure" Test Provides the Causal Nexus Between 
Impact and Emotional Injury 
696 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that a defendant is responsible for injuries sustained by a plaintiff 
in a car accident, including aggravation of the plaintiffs pre-accident condition, limited to the extent that the 
plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not using a seat belt). 
53 See, e.g, Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78,81 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[P]sychological vulnerability is on the same footing 
with physical."). 
IS4 
.. Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
1,) See id. 
-. 
IS&-- SeeMKtinez, 96N.M.at 451,631 P.2dat 1319;Padgetv. Gray, 727 S.W.2d 706,711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). - 
&Feeton, note 39, 5 54, at 363 n.37. 
15' a, Whatley v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 351 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[Tlhe tonfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him. However, a tortfeasor is liable only for the direct and proximate results of his 
wrongful act."). 
For the Madrid court, the plaintiffs fear of developing .4IDS was the natural and 
.- probable consequence of suffering an impact with bloody fluid."' Without much rumination, the 
&&drkJ court decided that because a physical impact had occurred. the traditional rule applied: 
"emotional injuries suffered by the victim of [a] tortious impact are recoverab~e."'~~ Physical 
contact satisfied causation, reasoned the court, because it made the emotional harm resulting 
from the Medical Center's negligent conduct foreseeable.16' In other words, conduct that results 
in one being splashed with bloody fluid-ven if it is unknown whether the fluid even contains 
HIV-should make an attendant fear of possibly developing AIDS foreseeable. In this regard, 
the Madrid decision represents a throw back to the early "impact" cases that permitted recovery 
pursuant to minor contacts that had no real part in causing the complained of harm.16' As noted 
in Payton v. Abbott Labs, "[tlhat these classes of cases exist is not a sufficient basis for allowing 
recovery, absent some additional element of satisfactow  roof, for emotional distress which is 
-- 
not a reasonably foreseeable result of a defendant's merely negligent condu~t ." l~~ 
While courts have held that establishing proximate causation requires that the emotional 
distress be reasonably foreseeable,I6' "[qoreseeability is only one element of [ca~sation]."'~~ 
Other considerations include "whether the relationship between cause and effect is too 
at ten~ated." '~~ Such considerations explain why the impact rule as applied by the Madrid court 
'" See Madrid v Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,274,923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996). 
159 - Id. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157 (citing Marchica v. Long IslandR.R., 3 1 F.3d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1994)). In 
adopting the impact rule, the Madrid Court relied exclusively on the Folz and Marchica decisions. See Madrid, 122 
N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159. Each of these cases involved plaintiffs that sustained phvsical iniuries resulting from 
physical impacts, rather than just suffering physical impacts alone as was the case for the plaintiff in Madrid. See 
Folz v. State, 1 LO N.M. 457,461,797 P.2d 246,250 (1990), 4 Marchica, 31 F.3d at L200: see also, supra notes 
57-60 and accompanying text (discussing how courts and commentators have distinguished physical impact from 
physical injury). In fact, the Marchica court noted that had the plaintiff "merely touched [a] discarded hypodermic 
needle" instead of suffering an actual puncture wound injury "the case would stand on a d~fferent footing." 
Marchica, 3 1 F.3d at 1204. 
I6%ee Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (citing Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)). 
161 See Keeton, note 39, 5 54, at 363 & n.42. 
- I6'G N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982) (emphasis added). 
u,Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 17 (N.J. 1997). 
Wyatt v. G~lmore, 290 S.E2d 790,791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
165 See id. See also Lopezv. Maez, 98 N.M. 625,630,651 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1982) (setting out the elements for 
negligence and requir~ng "[a] reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury."). 
-25- 
has been abandoned by the great majority of j~risdictions. '~~ While on the one hand, the rule has 
-_ been criticized as imposing arbitrary limitations--denying recovery for genuine emotional 
disturbance in the absence of physical ~ontact'~'--on the other hand. it has been castigated when 
invoked to permit recovery where the physical impact had but a tenuous causal connection to the 
emotional harm.I6' Concerns over attenuated causation have resulted in a more reasoned 
approach. For example, some courts have held that in order to recover under the impact n ~ l e  
"[tlhe mental injury must be the natural and direct result of the plaintiffs physical injury."'69 The 
same principle has even been espoused by the New Mexico courts when discussing the recovery 
of general damages for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries: 
"damages are such as naturally and necessarily flow from the wrong act."'70 It seems axiomatic 
then that some causal connection between the negligent impact and the mental injury must be 
demonstrated before damages can be recovered. 
- In the "fear of future disease" context, actual exposure to the disease causing agent 
itself-as opposed to contact with something that & contain a disease causing agent-has 
provided this necessary causal link between impact and emotional distress."' In these types of 
See Fink, lr., w note 28, at 781 & n.18; -, 437 N.E.2d at I76 n.6 (noting that Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
~ e n G k y ,  and Missouri still apply the traditional impact rule). 
167 See Keeton, note 39, 5 54, at 364. 
I" 8-, 437 N.E.2d at 180; Fink, Jr., -note 28, at 781; see Keeton, w note 39, 5 54, at 364 
( n o z g  the "absurdity" in certain applications of the rule). 
' 69  See,, Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922,925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 
N.E.2d 452,454 (Ind. 1991)); see Williamson v. Bennett, 112 S.E.2d 48,52 (N.C. 1960) ("the emotional 
disturbance. . . must be the natural and proximate result of the injury . . . ,"); W A ,  290 S.E.2d at 791 ("A tort- 
feasor is liable to the injured party for all of the consequences which are the natural and direct result ofhis conduct. 
. . ."); Luepke, w note 28, at 123 1("Under the [impact] rule, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
negligently caused the plaintiff to suffer a physical impact, and that the impact and immediately resulted in 
emotional distress.") (emphasis added); Zakarin, -note 45, at 267 ("While in a basic negligence action there 
need only be a 'reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury,' in an action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, there must be a direct causal connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury which the plaintiff sustains."). The same has been expressed in cases analyzing "fear of AIDS" 
claims. See,, Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997) ("A plaintiff who has 
suffered a physical impact and injury due to a defendant's negligence may recover for emotional distress that the 
- in'ury &g& causes.") (emphasis added). 
17'See Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379,381,552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Mobile City Lines, Inc. 
v. ~f;;ctor, 130 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1961)). 
17' Dworkin, -note 78, at 546. -Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("[Iln the 
reported cases permitting a plaintiff to recover for fear of cancer from exposure to carcinogens, the fact of exposure 
cases, satisfaction of the impact rule has required m f  of ingestion, inhalation, or some other 
more direct exposure to the identifiable carcinogen, contagion, or other disease causing entity to 
which plaintiffs fear they have been subje~ted."~ By contrast, under the rationale from Madrid, 
satisfaction of the impact rule only requires minimal contact with the possible conduit of disease 
transmission, rather than impact with the disease-causing agent itself. For example, the plaintiff 
in Madrid experienced an impact with bloody fluid (a potential conduit of disease transmission). 
At the time of the incident it was unknown whether the fluid was even HIV-contaminated."' Yet 
the plaintiffs cause of action for emotional distress was not dependent upon proof that she had 
suffered an impact with, or actual exposure to, HIV.'" Impact with blood alone was sufficient. 
In this regard, perhaps the Madrid decision is better characterized as a "fear of blood" case rather 
than a "fear of AIDS" case."' 
Such a holding invites ignorant claims. For example, under the Madrid reasoning 
- 
recovery would be permitted "for the fear of developing tuberculosis based on evidence that a 
person had coughed in the plaintiffs face, or for fear of cancer where the plaintiff had inhaled or 
ingested an unknown substance, all without any proof that a disease-causing agent was 
present."'76 The basis for recovery in Madrid is even more attenuated: the bloody fluid to which 
has a been established.") (emphasis added); Dmry v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668, 673-74 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("A common thread running through these cases is reflected in the requirement that the alleged 
fear. . . fmd its origin in actual exposure to a substance or condition capable of causing the feared disease or 
malady.") 
172 See Joseph C. Kearfon, et. al., Current Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation, SB73 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1,25 (1997). 
%?lummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (entrance of tubercle bacilli into the body constitutes an 
impact); Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (drinking contaminated water 
establishes impact); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (prenatal exposure 
to DES satisfies impact); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (inhalation 
of asbestos fibers constitutes impact). But Plummer v. Abbon Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920,927 (D.R.I. 1983) 
(ingestion of DES not sufficient to establish impact). 
I n  See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,270,923 P.2d 1154, 1155 (1996). 
See -- id. at278,923 P.2d at 1163 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate just because actual exposure 
had not been demonstrated). 
175 In essence, the Madrid Court allowed recovery based upon a superficial contact that played "no part in causing 
-~ the real harm." See., K e e t o n , m  note 39, 5 54, at 363 & n.42. 
17' See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 88 1,889 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). A more explicit example would be allowing recovery 
forfear of cancer where the plaintiff inhaled dust particles while removing insulation from pipes in the basement of 
an old home, without requiring proof that the inhaled dust actually contained asbestos fibers. See Burk v. Sage 
Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285,288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("[Wlhile injuries stemming from a fear of contracting illness 
-27-  
the plaintiff was exposed might have contained HIV, which have been transmitted through 
.- 
unhealed paper cuts, and which might have survived transmlsslon, & resulting in 
sero~onversion.'~~ This represents a "possibility, based on a potential, based on a possibility."'78 
To avoid such scenarios, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have required proof 
of actual exposure to HIV.'79 The two-pronged "actual exposure" test requires proof of both a 
scientifically accepted channel of transmission and that the alleged conduit of transmission 
actually contained HIV.'~'  Courts adopting the actual exposure test have pointed out that "[tlo 
recognize a cause of action . . . when the presence of HIV is not shown. . . is clearly unsound . . . 
[flear in such situations may be genuine but it is based on speculation rather than fact."'st Much 
like the "fear of future disease" precedent that spawned the actual exposure rule,la2 cases 
analyzing fear of AIDS claims also recognized that "[plerrnitt~ng recovery of damages in tort for 
fear of disease based solely upon an unproven supposition that exposure to a disease-causing 
- 
agent could have occurred, absent any facts showing that exposure did in fact occur, would run 
afoul of the most basic tenets of tort law."183 Put another way, fear of disease stemming only 
after exposure to a diseasecausing agent may present compensable damages, injuries stemming fmm fear of the 
initial exposure [incident] do not."). 
177 , Neal, 873 P.2d at 889 (presenting an analogous factual scenario). 
17' See Doe v. Doe, 519N.Y.S.2d 595,599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
'79 &, Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 138,909 P.2d 14, 19 (Ct. App. 1995) (listing 
several jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" rule). See Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 
1995); Rnssaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d253 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997); Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); Blair v. Elwoodunion Free Pub. Sch., 656 
N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997); 
Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 1996); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 
618 (Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (additional 
jurisdictions that have all adopted the actual exposure test). 
180 See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886. However, some courts applying the aclual exposure test have not required 
-- 
direct proof that HIV was present in the conduit of transmission. See, e.&, Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 888. In those 
instances where the alleged conduit of transmission is unavailable for HIV-testing, other evidence may be 
introduced to demonstrate that HIV was present during the exposure incident. See id. See also Zakarin, =a note 
45, at 282 ("[Ilf the source of the possible contamination is unknown, then a fear of contracting AIDS will be 
considered genuine."). 
'" See Maica, 682 N.E.2d at 256 (quoting Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861,867 (La. Ct. App. 
1 9 9 3 .  See Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., lnc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991) ("[Blefore a 
-. recovery for emotional distress damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there 
must fust be exposure to the disease. If there is not exposure, then emotional distress damages will be denied.") 
182 See, supra notes 89-90 and accompanvine text. 
-- 
'a' Lauren J. Carnillo, Comment ~ d d j n e ~ u ;  to the Fire: Realistic Fears or Unrealistic Damages in AIDS Phobia 
w, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 331, 342 (1994). "There is insufficient authority in most jurisdictions to suppon the notion 
from "the possibilitv of exposure is not a loss or detriment sufficient to create a legally 
.- 
compensable injury."ls4 
But for the Madrid court, the fear of possibly contracting HIV under the particular 
circumstances was a foreseeable one because the contact between bloody fluids and unhealed 
paper cuts provided a medically sound channel of transmi~sion.'~~ Having the channel of 
transmission requirement, surmised the court, made the second prong of the actual exposure 
test-proof that HIV is present-a redundant limiting de~ ice . ' ' ~  Apparently, the existence of a 
viable mode of transmission was enough to "create a presumption of exposure."187 However, if 
the conduit of transmission does not contain HIV, the possibility of contracting HIV is probably 
r~ 3,188 zero. 
Nonetheless, even if the presence of HIV were to be presumed, it is debatable whether 
unhealed paper cuts suffice as a medically channel of transmission. For example, while 
- 
HIV may be transmitted through contact between HIV-infected blood and non-intact skin, 
ninety-nine percent of all reported AIDS cases result from HIV transmission via sexual 
intercourse, intravenous drug abuse, or perinatal transmi~sion. '~~ Furthermore, the statistical 
probability of contracting HIV from a single needle stick injury--inarguably a more invasive 
impact than that suffered by the plaintiff inMA-assuming the needle was contaminated, is 
approximately 0.3 to 0.5 percent.'p0 Even HIV transmission in the health care setting is 
extremely rare. To date, no cases of HIV transmission from a physician to a patient have been 
reported, and the theoretical risk of HIV transmission from an infected health care worker to a 
that fear of contracting a disease is a compensable injury when there are no facts to show that an 'exposure' to the 
disease-causing agent or an 'exposure-causing event ever occurred." Id. at 346. 
Is4 Id. at 346-347 (emphasis added). 
I8"e Madrid v Lincoln County Med. C&., 122 N.M. 269,276,923 P.2d 1154,1161 (1996). 
186- See ~ d .  at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162. 
187-- 
- 
See id. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Williamson v Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180 011.5. Super. Ct. App. 
--
Div. 1996)). 
I88 Russaw v. Manin, 472 S.E.2d 508,511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe statistical probability of contracting 
HIV from a non-HIV contaminated needle is zero . . . .") 
189 See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553,558-59 & n.8 (Minn. 1995). 
-
patient, or visa versa during an invasive procedure is remote.19' Finally, even if a person is 
,- 
exposed to HIV-infected blood or blood-products, the transmission of HIV is not certain to 
occur.'92 Such information underscores the fact that the risk of contracting HIV from minor 
contacts is practically a statistical nullity. As noted by the Court in Doe v. Northwestern 
University: "[Elven a foreseeable fear of deadly disease may not be compensable if the feared 
contingency is too unlikely."'93 
b. The ''Actual Exposure" Test Assures That Fears Are Reasonable 
In addition to making emotional distress foreseeable, the actual exposure test also 
194 . satisfies causation by ensuring that one's fear is reasonable. Given the statistical improbability 
of contracting HIV from incidental contacts, the absence of proof of exposure to HIV during the 
alleged transmission incident makes the fear of developing AIDS unrea~onable. '~~ Undoubtedly, 
Z- 
there are instances where individuals fearing a possible exposure to HIV develop symptomology 
reflecting the genuineness of their emotional distress.'96 But it is not a question of whether the 
fear is genuine, rather it is a matter of whether the fear is reasonab~e.'~' The reasonableness 
standard requires that a plaintiff who fears developing AIDS possess "that level of knowledge of 
the disease that is then-current, accurate, and generally available to the This rule 
places an affirmative duty on individuals seeking recovery for fear of AIDS to take some 
See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A2d 627,630 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995). 
19'G Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995); K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559 
n.8Zittler & Rennert, =a note 30, at 1317. But Robert C. Gombar, AIDS in the Workolace: Selected Leaal 
&, 350 PLIiLit 103, 154-55 (discussing studies that documented the transmission of HIV from patients to 
healthcare workers). 
See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559 n.8. 
193 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997). See also Russaw, 472 S.E.2d at 512 (noting that damages can not be 
based on "imagined possibilities.") 
l9'See DeMilio, 666 A.2d at 632; Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880,887 (App. 
Div. 1996). 
195 See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Of course, a positive HIV test would be prima facie proof of reasonable fear. 
-- 
C- See id. at 886. 
-- 
196 a, Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881,887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (discussing how patients fearing exposure to 
HIV A- may experience welght loss, loss of sleep, and other symptomatic complamts). 
"' See id. 
198 - - See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,21 (N.J. 1997) 
-
responsibility in educating themselves about the acceptable modes of HIV transmission and the 
- - 
realistic risks of developing AIDS 19' Thls "self-education" requirement has not been viewed as 
unfair or unduly harsh given the widespread public information campaigns that have made such 
information readily accessible, if not u n a v ~ l d a b l e . ~ ~ ~  Absent the requirement, recovery for fear 
of AIDS would reward ignorant beliefs about HIV transmission and the likelihood of developing 
AIDS.~" The inference being that reasonable persons would not fear developing AIDS unless 
there was proof of actual exposure to HIV Several courts have found, therefore, that absent 
proof of actual exposure to HIV, any fear of developing AIDS is, as a matter of law, 
unreasonable.202 
In Madrid, however. the court considered one's fear of AIDS resulting from contact 
between bloody fluid and unhealed paper cuts reasonable, regardless of proof of actual HIV 
exposure.203 Ironically, in support of its position, the court referenced part of the New Mexico 
- 
"Public Health A C ~ , " ~ ' ~  which permits victims of sexual assaults to request that their conv~cted 
assailants be tested for the presence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.~" The coun 
deemed the statute a recognition by the legislature that fears are to be expected in those persons 
potentially exposed to HIV under circumstances in which a medically sound channel of 
transmission exists.206 To the contrary, unlike Madrid, the statute enacted by the New Mexico 
See id. at 22 (citing Shahvari, =a note 34, at 794). It has been suggested that such arule "effectively requires 
--
plaintiffs to mitigate their fears by learning what they can about the likelihood that they have contracted" HIV. See 
Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253,256 (111. App. Ct. 1997). 
See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22. 
"'See M, 682 N.E.2d at 255; Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997). 
~ i & s o n ,  696 A.2d at 20 (discussing how the objective reasonableness standard does not effectively counteract 
i norance because it does not directly address the availability of accurate information about H N  and AIDS). 
2g See Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995); Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508,512 (Ga. Ct. 
~pp.1996); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618,624 (Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 
668,675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
-~ 203 See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,276,923 P.2d 1154, 1161 (1996). 
2 M  - See N.M. Stat. Ann. @24-1-1, -1-9.1(A), -1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996) 
205 - See Madrid 122 N.M. at 276,923 P2d at 1161 n.2. (referencing N.M. Stat. Ann. §$24-1-9.1 (A), -1-9.2(A) 
-- 
(Repl. Pamp. 1996)). 
'06 -- See id. 
Legislature does not "presume" exposure.207 Instead, it permits of convicted assailants to 
,--. determine whether they are, in fact, HIV-infected, thus providing for a reliable assessment of the 
threat of actual exposure posed to  victim^.'^' Under the Madrid decision, recovery for fear of 
AIDS would be permitted where a sexual assault involves criminal penetration because the act 
would involve both a physical impact and a medically sound method of transmission. Therefore, 
the court's use of the statute to illustrate that actual exposure is unnecessary to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of one's fear is paradoxical. 
Finally, the court concluded that one's fear of developing AIDS absent proof of actual 
exposure to HIV was reasonable because of "the existing circumstances and the realities of the 
time" taking into consideration "reasonable reactions of real people."209 Apparently, it is not 
unreasonable to fear contracting HIV from blood or medical waste, even absent proof of the 
presence of HIV, particularly in "light of common knowledge.'"10 Unfortunately, this attitude 
serves to proliferate social stigmas and irrational phobias rather than justify legitimate claims. 
Public misconceptions regarding the transmission of HIV and the cause of AIDS should not be 
permitted to SeNe as a substitute for objective proof. 
B. Policy Considerations Favor Adopting a Rule That Minimizes Social Stigmas and 
Public Phobias 
Anxiety arising from the possibility of contracting HIV and developing AIDS generally 
reflects public misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance about the di~ease.~" Furthermore, 
ignorance about HIV and AIDS promotes hysteria and irrational fears, as well as prejudice, 
stigmatization and discrimination against those infected with HIV. '~~ For example, most people 
still believe that HIV can be transmitted through casual contact, that AIDS remains primarily a 
'07 -- See id. at 274, 823 P.2d at 1159 ("[Tlhe conduct is such to create a presllmption of exposure . . . .")(quoting 
- Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)). 
'08 See N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 24-1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1997). 
'09 -- See Madrid 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting W~lliamson, 677 A.2d at 1181). 
&id. (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1181). 
See Chadwick, note 63, at 159. 
-
"gay disease," and that AIDS, not heart disease or cancer, represents the number one health 
- problem in the nation.213 Not surprisingly then, public misconceptions and social stigmas 
associated with AIDS have resulted in unsubstantiated fears arising from benign incidents 
resulting in an influx of fear of AIDS Generalized ignorance and social stigmas 
surrounding AIDS implicate serious public policy concerns that compel adoption of the actual 
exposure rule because "[bly permitting plaintiffs to recover for mental anxiety over fear of AIDS 
in the absence of actual exposure, we risk fueling misperceptions about AIDS and how it is 
tran~rnitted."~'~ Public policy reasons in support of requiring proof of actual exposure were 
perhaps best expressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Brzoska v. Olson: 
AIDS is a disease that spawns widespread public misperception 
based upon the dearth of knowledge concerning HIV transmission. 
Indeed, plaintiffs rely upon the degree of public misconception 
about AIDS to support their claim that their fear was reasonable. 
To accept this argument is to contribute to the phobia. Were we to 
recognize a claim for the fear of contracting AIDS based upon a 
mere allegation that one have been exposed to HIV, totally 
unsupported by any medical evidence or factual proof, we would 
open a Pandora's Box of "AIDS-phobia" claims by individuals 
whose ignorance, unreasonable suspicion or general paranoia cause 
them apprehension over the slightest of contact with HIV-infected 
individuals or objects. Such plaintiffs would recover for their fear 
of AIDS, no matter how irrational . . . the better approach is to 
assess the reasonableness of a plaintiffs fear of AIDS according to 
the plaintiff's &-not potential-exposure to H I V . ~ ' ~  
The Madrid court failed to devote even a single sentence to any of these policy concerns. 
Instead, the court declared that its decision would serve as an incentive to decrease the number of 
negligent exposwe incidents, thereby serving the "laudable goal of promoting public health."217 
See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,21 (N.J. 1997). 
213 - See Fink, Jr., note 28, at 803 & 1111.164-67. 
*"See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627,630 (N.J.  Super. Ct. 1995). 
"' See Fink, Jr., a note 28, at 803 (emphasis in original). 
- 668 A.2d 1355, 1363 (Del. 1995). 
'I7 See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,277,923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (1996). See Terry C. Gay 
& ~ z e  F. Rosato, Combatino Fear of Future Inium and Medical Monitoring Claims, 61 Def. Couns. J. 554,557 
(1994) (citing Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 630 So. 2d 861, 868-69 (La. Ct. App. 1994)) (supporting 
recoplition of a duty not to expose others to a disease in order to reduce its spread). 
More realistically, the Madrid decision will serve the opprobrious goal of rewarding ignorance 
f. and promoting public misconceptions about HIV and AIDS. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Madrid, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized for the first time a cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of developing AIDS arising from possible 
exposure to HIV. The decision formally recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress outside the bystander-liability context. The Madrid court adopted the 
traditional impact rule, permitting recovery for emotional injuries resulting from a tortious 
impact, provided a medically sound channel of transmission exists. In doing so, the court 
rejected the "actual exposure" limiting device adopted by the majority of jurisdictions. The 
decision will do little to deter unreasonable conduct, but will go a long way in reinforcing social 
stigmas and public phobias about HIV and AIDS. 
ERIC J. KNAPP 
